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REVIEW ESSAY
RAWLS'S EXCESSIVELY SECULAR POLITICAL
CONCEPTION
Gary C. Leedes*
"Five different epistemologies in an evening. Take your
choice. They're all agreeable, and not one is binding or nec-
essary or has true strength or speaks straight to the soul.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Political Liberalism,2 John Rawls clarifies the differences
between general theories of human nature and his model of
justice.3 Unlike most philosophers in the Western tradition,
Rawls does not place the subject of justice within a comprehen-
sive theory of human behavior.4 His conception of justice rests
* Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond;
B.S.E., 1960, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1962, Temple Law School; LL.M.,
1973, Harvard Law School; S.J.D., 1984, Harvard Law School.
1. SAUL BELLOW, HUMBOLDT'S GIFT 390 (1976).
2. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). Bernard Williams writes, "There are
many questions, about social justice, toleration and the stability of the modern state,
that can scarcely be discussed unless one starts from ideas that have been shaped by
Rawls." Bernard Williams, A Fair State, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, May 13, 1993 at 7.
3. Rawls "takes as his point of departure, not a general theory of human nature,'
but what he calls 'the public culture of a democratic society." John Gray, Can We
Agree to Disagree?, N.Y. TIMEES, May 16, 1993, § 7, at 35 (reviewing JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
4. Stuart Hampshire, Liberalism: The New Twist, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Aug. 12,
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solely on a unique "construct"5 called the "liberal political con-
ception" (LPC).6 Rawls claims that his freestanding LPC, if
adopted by citizens of a constitutional democracy, could unite
reasonable persons otherwise divided by their ideologies. As a
result,, citizens-given favorable conditions-enjoy the benefits
of a stable, well-ordered society.
In the well-ordered society envisioned by Rawls, citizens
honor fair terms of social cooperation because they no longer
make fundamentally important political decisions based on
polarizing religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines. Instead,
they resolve issues of basic justice solely on the basis of shared
political values. Rawls claims that social unity can prevail and
endure under the LPC for several generations, notwithstanding
the prevalence of many incompatible comprehensive ideologies,7
because there are enough reasonable people who recognize the
benefit of shared liberal political principles of justice.8
Although Rawls is America's pre-eminent living political phi-
losopher, his LPC will not please everyone; it will be rejected in
some respects by persons who find it "disembodied and idealis-
tic."9 His constructivism will also be criticized by those who
1993 at 44.
5. Rawls calls his LPC a construct, the product of his method of political
constructivism. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 89-129. For a critique of Rawls's
constructivism, see JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 25-30 (1993).
6. The political ideas contained within the LPC are: 1) the belief that rationality
is good; 2) the desirability of a fair distribution of the primary goods needed by all
free and equal citizens who pursue rational life plans (e.g., basic liberties, income,
wealth, social bases of self-respect); 3) the irrelevance of comprehensive conceptions of
the good incompatible with principles of justice; 4) the desirability of citizens having
morally superior character traits (e.g., the political virtues of civility, tolerance, rea-
sonableness, and a sense of fairness) and 5) the goodness of a stable and cooperative,
well-ordered (political) society. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 176, 178, 190, 194.
7. Id. at xviii.
8. See id. at xxv.
9. Bernard Williams, supra note 2, at 7. Robert Bork writes, "Rawls approaches
his topic not through an examination of American society, its institutions, and its
stresses but through a highly abstract and complex contractarian theory that advanc-
es a political agenda whose main appeal will be to persons already of the left-liberal
persuasion ." Robert Bork, Justice Lite, FIRST THINGS 31 (Nov. 1993) (reviewing JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)). Bork adds, "POLITICAL LIBERALISM is not mere-
ly unworldly and egalitarian beyond reason but contains strong authoritarian
elements inappropriate to a constitutional democracy." Id. at 32.
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believe Rawls underemphasizes the importance of empirical re-
search, and by those who believe that American and Western
European intuitions of justice cannot be applied as if they were
universally compelling principles. Additionally, the LPC will be
rejected by many religious groups who are denied certain privi-
leges and exemptions by Rawls's excessively secular political
conception.1' Rawls disapproves of citizens who explicitly refer
to their religious beliefs when they engage in political activi-
ty."1 Rawls, however, does not adequately distinguish between
a political activist's manipulative use of religion and intellectu-
ally honest religious expression that is politically relevant. He
does not distinguish between ethical strategies of persuasion
and unethical strategies of domination such as blackmail-type
threats of damnation. Rawls also largely ignores distinctions
between religious rhetoric used as a weapon to diminish free-
dom and religious rhetoric used to expand religious freedom or
other civil rights. Rawls seeks to contain religious rhetoric
whether or not it is intemperate and harsh or moderate and
conciliatory. With few exceptions, he condemns any mixture of
religion of politics, and he urges citizens to adjust their reli-
gious principles and temper their religious speech.
To justify his LPC, Rawls refers to an imaginary assembly of
representatives whose agreements will be honored by the public
at-large. The negotiations of these politically unaccountable,
politically unresponsive and fictitious "representatives" occur
under unrealistic conditions where no citizen has any bargain-
ing advantages and all citizens are represented.'2 Rawls's
LPC, however, does not merely describe procedural justice; it is
the source for the following two carefully worded substantive
principles of justice:
10. Rawls hopes (within the limits allowed by freedoms of speech, conscience, and
thought) to contain the spread of unreasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines that have the potential to "undermine the unity and justice of
society." RAWLS, supra note 2, at xvi-xvii. Rawls admits that some persons comment-
ing on his work have warned him that his LPC is excessively secular. Id. at 194
n.28.
11. See id. at 245 n.32 (criticizing references to theology during political debates
over the abortion issue). See also infra text accompanying notes 112-13, 145-77.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32-38.
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a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a
similar scheme of liberties for all.
13
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society. 4
According to the requirement of equality in the first principle
of justice, religious persons are not entitled to any special ex-
emptions when general laws prohibit acts or forbearances man-
dated by their religious beliefs.' 5 Under the "justice as fair-
ness" principles and the LPC, persons whose religion-based acts
or omissions are prohibited by generally applicable laws cannot
depend on either freedom of thought or liberty of conscience for
protection"6 since those basic liberties do not immunize enough
religion-based conduct.'7 In Rawls's view, persons who elevate
their religion's mandates over secular law do not deserve great-
er freedom than persons whose secular beliefs dictate non-com-
pliance with the law.'" In fact, persons who justify their con-
scientious refusals to obey law on religious grounds are less
deserving of special exemptions than persons who refuse, on
secular political grounds, to conform to laws that violate "a
commonly shared conception of justice." 9
Rawls distinguishes between the ordinary liberties and in-
alienable basic liberties that cannot be legally restricted in
order to advance the general welfare. Rawls's short list" of in-
13. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 291 (emphasis added). According to Rawls, this first
principle is "preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens' basic needs
be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand
and to be able fruitfully to exercise th[eir] rights and liberties." Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 291.
15. Id. Rawls also discussed his refusal to guarantee religious persons special ex-
emptions from general laws in an earlier work. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
205-11, 368-71, 379, 384-85 (1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
16. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 311 (discussing the basic liberty of conscience).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 184-99.
18. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 314.
19. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 365. See also id. at 369, 385.
20. As Rawls writes, an enlargement of his list of guaranteed basic liberties would
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alienable basic liberties includes certain political rights includ-
ing political speech, freedom of thought, the liberty and
integrity of the person, liberty of conscience, certain supporting
liberties, and certain rights and liberties covered by the rule of
law." Unless a compelling interest is endangered by the exer-
cise of an inalienable liberty, the government's power to abridge
the liberty is not recognized as lawful by judges. However,
Rawls does not want judges to use any "compelling interest"
test, or any other form of strict judicial scrutiny, when general-
ly applicable statutes advancing the general welfare interfere
with the practice of religion. In view of Rawls's refusal to recog-
nize religious liberty as a preferred fundamental right, I
maintain that his LPC is excessively secular.
In this review essay, I discuss most of the important ideas
intertwined in Rawls's theory of justice, including the idea of a
"political conception," 2 the idea of society as a "fair system of
cooperation,"" the political conception of a "person,"24 the
idea of a "well-ordered society,"25 the idea of an "overlapping
consensus,"26 the "ideal of public reason,"" and the idea of a
family of basic liberties within a coherent system of law based
on the two powers of moral identity. In order to prepare the
reader for a more detailed discussion of these topics, I will
briefly introduce five of Rawls's fundamental ideas.
II. FiVE FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS
A. The Idea of a Liberal Political Conception of Justice
Rawls's LPC is designed to provide the framework essential
for "a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation
"risk weakening the protection of the most essential ones and recreat[e] . . .indeter-
minate and unguided balancing problems." RAWLS, supra note 2, at 296.
21. For a more complete list of basic liberties recognized by Rawls, and his expla-
nation of the criteria governing their selection, see infra section VIII.A.
22. See infra part HA.
23. See infra part II.B.
24. See infra part H.D.
25. See infra part II.E.
26. See infra part V.
27. See infra part VII.
28. See infra part VIII.
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to the next."29 His LPC is not a comprehensive view of the
world. If it were, it would conflict with the divisive and contro-
versial comprehensive doctrines affirmed by different members
of society. The LPC is generated separately from, but is tailored
for and compatible with, several different moral codes and epis-
temologies that have a more encompassing range of application.
B. The Idea of Society as a Fair System of Cooperation Over
Time
The idea of society as a fair system of cooperation continuing
from one generation to the next presupposes the existence of
reasonable persons in power. When a fair system of cooperation
is established, reasonable citizens "may reasonably be expected
to accept [the governing norms], provided that everyone else
likewise accepts them,""0 their ideologies notwithstanding. The
element of reasonableness, defined somewhat uniquely by
Rawls, makes the goal of social cooperation seem attainable
even though some critics having more government experience
than Rawls say that "what fragments our society is ... group
animosities and fights for material advantage" rather than
comprehensive ideologies."'
C. The Problematic Idea of a Hypothetical Original Position: A
Teaching Tool for Simulating Fair Bargaining Conditions
Imagine that "parties" representing all members of society
assemble to negotiate the terms of a social contract containing
fair terms of social cooperation. Rawls uses this thought experi-
ment skillfully to help readers organize ideas about justice and
to prove that his carefully worded "justice as fairness" princi-
ples would probably be selected by citizens in a real constitu-
tional convention if every citizen were represented fairly.32
The hypothetical parties are partially blinded by a so-called
veil of ignorance preventing them from knowing much about
29. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 14.
30. Id. at 300.
31. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 31.
32. Rawls describes the presocial parties as "merely artificial creatures inhabiting
[a] device of representation." RAWLS, supra note 2, at 28.
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the citizens they represent. For example, the parties lack in-
formation about any particular citizen's social position, religion,
race, gender, sex and ethnicity. 3 They also lack information
about the aims, interests and aspirations of the persons they
represent.34 Moreover, the fictitious parties do not know the
skills, talents, abilities, tastes or strengths of those they rep-
resent." Since all the parties are equally uninformed in this
decontextualized situation, they are "symmetrically situated,"
36
and if they rely on true premises,37 perform their duties prop-
erly and rationally, and reach a unanimous agreement, all
represented "citizens ... are represented fairly."3
8
D. The Political Conception of a Person as a Democratic
Citizen
Rawls describes democratic citizens as reasonable persons
who can "view themselves apart from certain religious, philo-
sophical and moral convictions."39 His idealized description of
persons is quite different from the conceptions of persons used
in psychology, the social sciences and the natural sciences.40
According to Rawls, the "justice as fairness" principles can be
derived from his conception of reasonable persons capable of
governing themselves cooperatively and democratically.
In Rawls's opinion, persons endowed with the power to have
a conception of good can inter alia form, revise and rationally
pursue political and non-political aims and commitments.41
Persons also have the capacity to "affirm the values of political
justice and [they] want to see them embodied in political insti-
tutions and social policies."42 Because persons are both reason-
33. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 25.
34. RAWIS, supra note 2, at 79.
35. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 272. See also supra text accompanying note 12; infra
text accompanying notes 221-27.
36. Rawls, supra note 2, at 24, 79. Symmetrically situated bargaining parties do
not engage in force, coercion, deception or fraud. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 102-03.
38. Id. at 79-80.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 18 n.20.
41. Id. at 30.
42. Id. at 30-31.
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able and rational, they can "adjust and reconcile"43 their re-
spective aims, interests and commitments in accordance with
principles deemed reasonable by every other normal person.4
E. The Notion of a Well-Ordered Society
A well-ordered society can be established if the following
conditions are satisfied: (1) everyone accepts and knows that
everyone else accepts the "justice as fairness" principles;4 (2)
society's coordinated institutions function in accordance with the
"justice as fairness" principles; (3) cooperative citizens subordi-
nate their conflicting conceptions of good and willingly comply
with the regulations and restrictions imposed by society's insti-
tutions because they regard these norms as just,46 and (4)
public discussions and decisions are guided by peer pressures
that oblige all citizens to avoid relying explicitly on controver-
sial axioms of religion, morality and philosophy when they
engage in political activity.'
These conditions are unrealistic and cannot be satisfied with-
out the kind of reasonable pluralism that exists only when the
conflicting comprehensive doctrines affirmed by society's mem-
bers are not rigid.' The flexibility of their comprehensive doc-
trines enables reasonable "citizens [to] converge on roughly the
same principles of justice from quite different and incompatible
moral and philosophical perspectives."49 When this convergence
occurs, there is what Rawls calls an overlapping consensus. 0
In sum, the idea of a well ordered society depends on an over-
lapping doctrinal consensus, which depends on reasonable plu-
ralism, which depends on flexible doctrines adhered to by rea-
sonable persons.
43. Id. at 31.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 35.
46. Id.
47. See infra part VII.
48. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 63-55.
49. Jeremy J. Waldron, N.Y. TIMES LITERARY SUPp., June 18, 1993, at 5.
50. See discussion infra part V.
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III. THE VIRTUE OF REASONABLENESS
In this section, two aspects of reasonableness will be dis-
cussed, namely (1) the willingness of reasonable persons to
propose and agree to fair terms of cooperation and (2) the rec-
ognition by reasonable persons of their fallible judgment. I also
discuss the problem of motivation, which is not adequately
taken into account in Rawls's explanation of reasonableness.
A. The First Aspect of Reasonableness
According to Rawls, reasonable citizens in public discourse
propose and accept terms of social cooperation that other rea-
sonable citizens "publicly recognize" as just.5 Reasonable per-
sons also willingly cooperate with each other according to some
shared criteria for evaluating the fairness of behavioral norms.
Conversely, an unreasonable person is unwilling to propose and
abide by "general principles or standards for specifying fair
terms of cooperation."52
Reasonableness is a political virtue that supplements one's
capacity to be rational; the latter is a human trait that is con-
cerned both with means-end reasoning and the deliberate order-
ing of ends according to a list of preferences. A person can be
rational but unreasonable if she lacks the will to engage in fair
cooperation on terms that others might reasonably be expected
to endorse.53 A person is both rational and reasonable only if
she is willing to moderate her self-interest, ends and attach-
ments in order to live amiably with others on a basis of mutual
trust and respect. Rawls believes that reasonable persons will
subordinate their rational desires in order to conform to "justice
as fairness" principles.'
51. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 53.
52. Id. at 50.
53. Id. at 51.
54. Id. at 339-40, 367.
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According to Rawls, reasonable persons always honor the
claims of democratic civility. As he explains, persons have two
distinctive powers of moral identity (sometimes called moral
personality) that "work in tandem to specify the idea of fair
terms of cooperation.""5 When conflicts of duty arise, the rea-
sonable person's rational conceptions of good, comprehensive
and determinate, are subordinated to shared political concep-
tions of justice. According to Rawls, relying purportedly on
general principles of human psychology, only abnormal persons
lack the capacity to be reasonable. Rawls claims his context-
transcending, post-metaphysical assumptions regarding reason-
ableness are somehow superior to dogmatic, metaphysical
worldviews; however, this claim is disputed by contextualists for
whom there is no single transcendent standard of reasonable-
ness that is epistemologically or morally superior to so-called
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines."6 Rawls's distinction
between reasonable persons who are normal, and unreasonable
persons who are abnormal, stigmatizes devoutly religious per-
sons who do not satisfy his secular criterion of reasonableness,
and "[it suggests that a voluntary exile or emigrant, a hermit
or wanderer, a detached aesthete or artist, is a delinquent,
short of fall humanity."57
B. The Second Aspect of Reasonableness
A second aspect of the virtue of reasonableness, as expounded
by Rawls, pertains to the willingness of persons to be tolerant
owing to their recognition of their fallible judgment.5" No one
can always be expected to make correct judgments59 and
"[m]any hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer."0
As persons begin to doubt whether their positions on various
political issues are true, their zealousness and rigidity decline.
They become more moderate. Even their comprehensive doc-
trines become more pliable, more accommodating.6" Unfortu-
55. Id. at 52, 54.
56. See HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 95.
57. Hampshire, supra note 4, at 44.
58. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 94.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 57.
61. According to Rawls, reasonable persons affirm only reasonable comprehensive
1092
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nately Rawls does not emphasize the need for an ongoing dia-
logue between reasonable liberals and religiously devout per-
sons who are viewed by him as rigid and unreasonable.
C. The Problem of Motivation
Persons who have firmly held convictions and who do not
accept Rawls's conception of reasonableness might ask, "Why
should I willingly support and comply with laws restricting my
religious liberty when those laws violate my firmly held reli-
gion-based convictions?" Rawls understands that persons must
be "sufficiently motivated" to endorse an LPC that preempts
their comprehensive doctrines.6 2 Rawls, however, believes that
all reasonable persons will be sufficiently motivated to endorse
"justice as fairness" principles when they recognize that they
adequately secure everyone's basic rights and liberties." Rawls
also promises citizens self respect," "mutual respect for one
another,"" and the absence of civil strife driven by dogmatic
ideologies. In his view, reasonable persons would gladly trade
the "rigid" aspects of their religion, philosophy, and morals in
return for the promissory note of social unity. Rawls, at times,
seems to forget that many people have been brutally oppressed
throughout history by officials advancing doctrines of social
conformity and unity.
Rawls has an enormous burden of proof if he hopes to con-
vince religious persons that they are unreasonable if they do
not willingly obey laws that, in their view, result in the damna-
tion of their children.6 For example, the Old Order Amish
insist on withdrawing their children from schools accredited by
the government in accordance with a rational interpretation of
the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this
doctrines, i.e., intelligible views of the world based on theoretical and practical rea-
son, which normally draw upon slowly evolving traditions of thought. Id. at 59.
62. Id. at 87.
63. See id. at 86.
64. Id. at 318.
65. Id. at 319.
66. "Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief
that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S 205, 210 (1972).
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world.... ."I' These Amish parents urgently need a religious
exemption from compulsory education laws since their "religion
pervades and determines virtually their entire way of life, regu-
lating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strict-
ly enforced rules of the church community."" Without an ex-
emption and an adequate guarantee of religious liberty, many
Amish parents and their like-minded teenage children will be
oppressed by "justice as fairness" principles.
Rawls rejects the arguments of persons who claim they lack
the capacity to be cooperative because of their rigid comprehen-
sive doctrines.69 He presumes that normal persons are able to
control and revise their wants and desires as circumstances re-
quire.7 ° Moreover, Rawls claims that "free persons do not
think of themselves as indissolubly tied to any particular final
end, or family of such ends, but regard themselves as always
capable of appraising and revising their aims in light of reason-
able considerations."" Rawls's claim that people will be moti-
vated by the benefits produced by social unity lacks substantial
evidentiary support. He does not provide the reader with any
social science data concerning patterns of social interaction
relevant to his argument that persons will be motivated to
adhere to his LPC. In order for Rawls's argument to have per-
suasive force, we need much more evidence, certainly more than
Rawls provides, indicating whether "normal" human beings,
regardless of their religious training, are biologically predis-
posed to welcome principles of justice that do not guarantee
them adequate religious liberty. His discussion of human psy-
chology is not supported by social science data. The disting-
uished social scientist James Q. Wilson tells us of empirical
findings indicating a core of nearly universal attitudes and be-
liefs, some of which question the substantive content of Rawls's
67. Id. at 216.
68. Id.
69. Citizens, whether religious or not, must recognize, according to Rawls, that the
significance of their claims is not given by the strength and psychological intensity of
their wants and desires, however rational they might be. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at
34.
70. Id. at 280.
71. Id.
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"justice as fairness" principles. 2 It is therefore difficult to sup-
port Rawls's LPC, which depends on untested abstractions and
does not respond to research in related disciplines that chal-
lenge his claims.
Political theorists would be more convincing if they relied
more on empirical studies drawn from a wide range of disci-
plines including, among others, economics, biology, neurobiology,
ego psychology, neuropsychology, anthropology, demography,
sociology and political science. Amatai Etzioni provides us with
substantial evidence showing that the most important basis for
decisions, even in market behavior, lies in the affective and
normative domain." This means that human beings often
make decisions on the basis of non-rational or pre-rational
considerations chiefly because they draw on normative-affective
sources.' 4 In short, Rawls's assertion that his principles of jus-
tice benefit everyone falls short of a demonstration that persons
will be motivated to adhere to them consistently over their
lifetime. 5
IV. RAwLs's CONTENTION THAT THE LPC is SUFFICIENTLY
OBJECTiVE LACKS PERSUASiVE FORCE
Philosophers vainly inflate their importance if they attempt
to go beyond clarifying the thinking of citizens who support
competing principles of justice. Even if a philosopher attempts
to make society more democratic, her proposed principles of
justice are just another entry in a vast marketplace of ideas
unless the persuasive force of his or her arguments actually
72. See A. MacIntyre, Book Review, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, at 13 (reviewing
JAMEs Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993)).
73. AmTAI ETZIOM, THE MORAL DIMENSION 90 (1988). As Hans-Georg Gadamer
notes, it is often not so much our judgments but our prejudices and traditions that
unconsciously guide us and constitute our being. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER's HERMENEUTICS: A
READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD 164-84 (1985).
74. ETZIONI, supra note 73, at 90.
75. Stuart Hampshire believes that "[t]he narrative of a person's life shows the
constantly shifting predominance of one set of contrary dispositions and ambivalent
feelings over another." Hampshire, supra note 4, at 46. If this is true, Rawls's argu-
ment is undercut by this tendency since many normal persons will, at various periods
of their lives, feel disinclined to adhere to the LPC.
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demonstrates to all that the proposed principles are superior to
all alternatives. Yet Rawls presumes he may say: "Here are two
objective principles that I have formulated; now, if you are
reasonable and want your society to be less unfair, endorse
them!" There is something elitist and undemocratic about a phi-
losopher designing, in the isolation of his study, 6 two princi-
ples of justice determining the ideological content of a nation's
constitution, which limits the power of some people and bur-
dens the liberties of others.
Rawls's principles of justice advancing ideas of reasonable
pluralism, secularism and tolerance, considered historically,
embody relatively recent ideas that are not influential in cer-
tain areas of the world. In many regions of the world, including
several localities in the United States, the idea that the LPC
preempts comprehensive doctrines of justice is not endorsed by
many ordinary persons whose religions pervade virtually all
spheres of their lives. Rawls, however, thinks his LPC can sat-
isfy an objective principle of legitimacy which stipulates that
"our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected
to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason."77
The objectivity of Rawls's LPC is quite different from the
criteria of truth and universal validity. Rawls admits as much;
he does not claim that his "justice as fairness" principles are
true or universally valid and he therefore does not claim they
bind each and every individual, always and everywhere without
exception.78 His criterion of legitimacy is in practice dependent
upon the consent of self-governing citizens. In contrast, Imman-
uel Kant's categorical imperatives are not agreement-seeking.
Indeed, for Kant, moral principles lack validity if their moral
76. In a democracy, the wording of principles of justice with the force of law is the
people's sole responsibility since they suffer the consequences if their constitution is
ill-designed.
77. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 137.
78. In a recent public lecture at Oxford, however, Rawls "extended his defense of
[political] liberalism to international politics." Hampshire, supra note 4, at 46.
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force depends solely on a social consensus or practice. 9 Simi-
larly, unlike the agreement-seeking persons adhering to Rawls's
liberalism, adherents of rational intuitionism believe moral
imperatives are derived from an order of values independent of
the persons making statements about moral imperatives8 0
They claim their binding principles of justice are "fixed by a
moral order"81 found in the nature of things. Rawls does not
claim his LPC has this kind of objectivity.8 2 However in
Rawls's opinion, the LPC is adequately objective for a regime if
there is:"
a) an established public framework of thought that is suffi-
ciently complete for partial judgments to be made by
citizens;"
b) a specified concept of correct political judgment that is
shared and accepted, namely the "justice as fairness" principles
interpreted according to the canons of practical reason;'
c) the expectation that reasonable and rational agents will
make political judgments on the basis of reasons specified by
the LPC, regardless of their motivation or personal preferenc-
es;86 and
d) an expectation that a citizen's personal point of view can-
not override the political agreements reached by a majority of
the other rational and reasonable citizens and lawmakers after
discussion and reflection.87
For Rawls, if the LPC is actually endorsed and the people
maintain social unity "over time, then this considered agree-
79. Wimi A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 137 (1991).
80. RAWiS, supra note 2, at 91. For rational intuitionists, the existence of the mor-
al order is not attributed to the mental activities or reasoning of human beings. Id.
at 91-92.
81. GALSTON supra note 79, at 135.
82. Rawls's theory has been criticized by Libertarians and Communitarians. See
CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILIP PE-rT, RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRrr-
Ics (1990).
83. I take the liberty of paraphrasing and condensing Rawls's discussion of the es-
sentials of objectivity.
84. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 110.
85. See id. at 115.
86. Id. at 111.
87. Id. at 111-12.
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ment in judgment, or narrowing of differences, normally suffices
for objectivity.""8
Concededly, principles of justice congenial to a particular
culture can be, from the standpoint of persons within that cul-
ture, objective. But Rawls does not insist on a genuine inter-
subjective agreement; he relies instead on what he calls an
overlapping consensus, which excludes many religious persons
as well as others whose firm convictions are insufficiently mod-
erated. 9 The overlapping consensus has not yet been estab-
lished anywhere in the world, therefore Rawls's claim that the
LPC is sufficiently objective is premature if not fanciful.
Like many other social contract theories, Rawls's notion of
consent is imputed." There cannot be any genuine overlapping
consensus unless every concerned citizen has an adequate op-
portunity to give or withhold informed consent.91 A require-
ment of equal participation by all citizens concerned with gover-
nance shifts the focus from what a philosopher on his own can
justify to a dialogic process of will formation. To satisfy this
requirement, every person affected by proposed principles of
justice should be admitted as an equal participant. This
includes many religious persons who are viewed, by Rawls, as
unreasonable.
Authentic mutual understanding occurs only when caring
persons in mutually comprehensible dialogue put themselves in
the place of their political adversary and attempt to reach mu-
tually satisfactory agreements-without any party being sub-
jected to coercion, duress, or manipulation. Many persons en-
gaged in such dialogues will not endorse proposed principles of
justice unless they are satisfied that the supporting arguments
are more cogent than arguments supporting competing propos-
88. Id. at 120.
89. See infra part VI.
90. According to the principle of discourse ethics, "[o]nly those norms can claim to
be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity
as participants in a practical discourse. JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 93 (Christian Lenhardt et al. trans., M.I.T. 1990) (1983).
91. Id. at 71.
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als. A genuinely ethical discourse cannot occur if the parties in
dialogue are incapable of empathy, the trait that enables secu-
larists to put themselves in the place of religious persons fright-
ened by Rawls's liberal secularism, which opposes any mixture
of religion and politics and which generally opposes legal ex-
emptions for the religiously devout. Dialogues leading to a so-
cial contract acceptable both to religious persons and Rawlsian
secularists cannot be realistically simulated by a philosopher's
thought experiment or introspective monologues, which rob the
social world of its legitimately ordered agreement-seeking, inter-
personal modes of communication. 92
Rawls has not indicated that he empathizes with the Amish
parents who, in his opinion, must send their children to schools
inculcating the basic values of Western democratic societies.
The Amish would tell Rawls, if they could, why his conception
of compulsory liberal education is analogous to the despotic
demands for conformity that required their great-great-grandfa-
thers to leave Europe for the United States.
In a face-to-face dialogue, assuming the Amish keep an open
mind and put themselves in the position of liberals, will
Rawls's arguments convince Amish parents that they deserve
imprisonment if they do not allow accredited school teachers
the opportunity to convince their children that their religious
convictions are anachronistic and unreasonable? If Rawls's ar-
guments are unconvincing, his failure to persuade does not
necessarily indicate the Amish parents are unreasonable any
more than Rawls is unreasonable if the Amish cannot convince
him, after he puts himself in their position,93 that they must
be guaranteed religious exemptions.
92. Rawls invites his readers to reach reflective equilibrium by asking themselves
"[how well [his] conception of political justice viewed as a whole 'articulates [their]
more firm considered convictions of political justice, at all levels of generality, after
due examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling [are]
made. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 28. This individualized introspective process by each
reader is again a monologic procedure rather than a dialogue among persons whose
belief systems cannot easily be brought into harmony with Rawls's LPC.
93. "To understand religiously conservative [persons] one needs to appreciate their
devotion to their children." Ralph Reed Jr., The Religious Right Reaches Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, § 4, at 15.
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In short, Rawls's idea of reasonableness is excessively secular
exclusionary, and insensitive to persons whose world views are
incompatible with the LPC's meld of egalitarian liberalism,
Western cultural norms, and modernity.
V. THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF AN OVERLAPPING
DOCTRINAL CONSENSUS
A. The Features of an Overlapping Consensus
Whether or not the "justice as fairness" principles are accept-
able to the religiously devout, Rawls believes they can support
an overlapping consensus legitimately under the following con-
ditions:
(a) There is "reasonable pluralism," a notion referring to the
presence of a great many persons affirming reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines (and conversely the absence of a significant
number of unreasonable people affirming unreasonable compre-
hensive doctrines).
(b) The governing principles of justice are congruent with
(nearly) every citizen's reasonable doctrines. Under such circum-
stances, "the doctrines making up the consensus" and the re-
quirements of the "justice as fairness" principle are no longer
"in conflict with citizens' essential interests."94
(c) All, or nearly all, citizens comply with the terms of coop-
eration specified by and derived from "justice as fairness"
principles because they believe the value of social unity clearly
outweighs conflicting values.95
To illustrate the nature of an overlapping consensus, Rawls
supplies his readers with a make-believe country where only a
few doctrines are competing for adherents. A Kantian or Millian
doctrine of morality is affirmed by one-third of the population.
Another one-third of the population is religious but they believe
that religious faith must be freely chosen. All other citizens
adhere to an ad hoc mixture of humanistic beliefs, and they
usually balance competing values in order to decide whether,
all things considered, the liberal values that guarantee basic
94. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 134.
95. Id. at 144-50.
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liberties and economic justice are more attractive and compel-
ling than competing values.
Given the narrow spectrum of views in this model case, the
reasonable persons in Rawls's make-believe country can simul-
taneously affirm both the LPC and their own diverging compre-
hensive, or partly comprehensive, doctrines.96 The religious
groups can support an LPC that guarantees freedoms of
thought, conscience, speech and association since these basic
liberties are consistent with their religious doctrines." Mfillian
utilitarians can support the LPC and its basic liberties as the
best workable solution among proposed alternatives advancing
general well-being; reasonable Kantians, without compromising
their "particular categorical imperatives,"" can also recon-
struct Kant's system of thought and apply it, as adjusted, to
conditions of reasonable pluralism. Finally, the humanists can
support the LPC because as a whole in their considered judg-
ment, its worth outweighs conflicting values.9 In sum, the
model case outlined by Rawls demonstrates that reasonable
persons affirming the LPC need not compromise00 any impor-
tant principles derived from their systems of thought.
As Rawls admits, there are at least four objections to the
kind of social unity he describes in his model case:'0 ' (1) an
overlapping consensus is a mere modus vivendi, a temporary
convergence of interests;0 2 (2) Rawls's overlapping consensus
of reasonable doctrines, rather than "true" doctrines, implies
indifference and skepticism concerning the truth of a political
conception of justice; 03 (3) the LPC is inadequately compre-
96. Id. at 145-46. Rawls's model case is a phoney set-up that does not resemble
any real pluralistic democracy.
97. Rawls does not seem to understand that most Americans have a more libertari-
an conception of the Constitution's guarantee of the free exercise of religion.
98. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 169-72.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 169. There is a bit of a cheat here by Rawls. So-called reasonable citi-
zeus in an overlapping consensus do not compromise their principles because they
already have trimmed them down to the point where further compromise is unneces-
sary.
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 146-47.
103. Id. at 150.
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hensive and therefore unworkable;" 4 and (4) an overlapping
doctrinal consensus productive of social unity, now or in the
near future, is utopian in the pejorative sense of that word.105
B. The Objection that the Overlapping Consensus is a Mere
Modus Vivendi
According to Rawls, the objection that the overlapping con-
sensus supporting the LPC is a mere modus vivendi misfires
because it overlooks significant differences between a temporary
marriage of convenience and a community united by enduring,
stronger and wider ties. The parties whose agreement is a mo-
dus vivendi remain ready to pursue most of their goals and
interests at the expense of their cohorts. The recent Persian
Gulf joint venture to free Kuwait is an example of a politically
expedient modus vivendi; each joint venturer reserved the right
to pursue its own national goals not involving the liberation of
Kuwait. In contrast, the overlapping consensus unifying the
three groups (religious, Millian-Kantian, and ad hoc humanistic)
in Rawls's model case' °6 is more stable allegedly because the
LPC uniting everyone has a moral object-enduring justice for
everyone-and criteria for political judgments that are not
based merely on self-interest. 0 7
As Rawls argues, an overlapping consensus requires more
conformity than a modus vivendi; for that very reason, many
religious groups in the United States strongly prefer a modus
vivendi to the regime Rawls has in mind. To become part of the
overlapping consensus, religious sects would have to modify the
aspects of their convictions that liberals consider unreasonable.
In return, the religious sects are included in a consensus en-
dorsing principles that deprive them of constitutionally guaran-
teed religious exemptions. Therefore, a modus vivendi is obvi-
ously preferable for many members of religious groups adverse-
ly affected by the demands and side effects of an overlapping
doctrinal consensus.
104. Id. at 154.
105. Id. at 158.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
107. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 148.
1102
RAWLS'S POLITICAL CONCEPTION
C. Rawls's Alleged Indifference and Skepticism
In Rawls's view, the stability of an overlapping consensus
depends on the exclusion of many doctrines from the public
discourse.' 8 Rawls would not approve of politically active citi-
zens asserting the truth of any precepts identified with their
particular comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doc-
trines. °9 Rawls's critics allege that his position "implies indif-
ference or skepticism as to whether a political conception of
justice can be true.""10 Rawls denies the allegation that he is
guilty of skepticism, a denial in some tension with his skeptical
claim that no one's judgment is infallible."'
Rawls is guilty of an offense more serious than healthy skep-
ticism when he takes the "truths of religion off the political
agenda"" 2 in order "to have some hope of uncovering a basis
of a stable overlapping consensus.""' This manipulative strat-
egy is rank censorship. Rawls acts as a censor when he
attempts to suppress what he perceives as needlessly divisive
religious arguments. Rawls has the reputation of being an
open-minded pluralist, but he actually opposes a robust, broadly
participatory public discourse of competent speakers who, with-
in the rules of relevance, may question all assertions, introduce
any assertion, and fully express their beliefs, attitudes, and
needs." 4
Americans conforming to the LPC must keep their religious
beliefs in the closet when they enter the field of politics; this
type of conformity is not in accordance with American tradi-
tions, customs and practices. This restriction violates the princi-
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. Skepticism is a word that can be
used honorably to describe a person with an inquiring mind, who, like Rawls, opposes
claims of infallibility.
112. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 151.
113. Id. at 152.
114. See HABERNIAS, supra note 90, at 89 (quoting R. Alexy, Eine Theorie des
Praktischen Diskurses, NORMENBEGRINDUNG, NoRENDURcHSETzUNG, 40 (1978)).
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ple of discourse ethics".. that assures adversely affected re-
ligious persons full and equal participation in political debates.
Some might defend Rawls's position by arguing that divisive,
faith-based presuppositions of religious persons are not
reasoned judgments based on shared premises. This haughty
defense, however, is unlikely to increase a religious person's
confidence in Rawls who promises freedom of speech, mutual
respect, and tolerance, but who censors religious speech during
political discussions.
D. The Objection that the LPC is Insufficiently Comprehensive
According to some critics, the LPC is too confined in scope to
adjudicate "many conflicts of justice that arise in public
life."116 Rawls denies the need for a more comprehensive con-
ception. Indeed, Rawls deliberately formulates a political con-
ception of justice different in kind from all other comprehensive
doctrines in order to narrow the disagreements".. caused by
religious speech. Rawls treats religious speech as an aggressive
and divisive mode of communication that must be confined to
the private sphere." 8 This kind of discriminatory treatment is
unlikely to end the culture wars".9 between many Americans
and their adversaries including Christian fundamentalists, Is-
lamic fundamentalists, conservative Catholics, and Orthodox
Jews. Rawls, is in cloud-cuckoo land if he thinks that religious
disagreements will be reduced in number by a political theory
that stigmatizes devout persons whose political opinions are
consistently aligned with their religious orientation. 120
115. See infra text accompanying notes 228-29.
116. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 154.
117. Id. at 156.
118. This posture is opposed by many accommodationists who do not value social
conformity. See Michael M. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CH.
L. REV. 115, 120 (1992).
119. For a description of culture wars, see JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
120. In the United States, the spectrum of thought is much wider than the narrow
range described in Rawls's model case. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
Moreover, without exemptions for religious groups, some religious sects that ordinarily
pose no threat to the rule of law would probably engage in destabilizing lawless ac-
tivity. See Frederick Mark Gedickes, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L.
REV. 671, 690 (1992).
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E. The Objection that the Stable Overlapping Consensus is
Utopian
Rawls's LPC is too shallow for many Americans desiring
more deeply rooted underpinnings that support a more compre-
hensive set of cherished values. Nevertheless, Rawls outlines in
two stages how the political, social and psychological forces
leading to an overlapping consensus can be strengthened. 2'
The first stage is a transition from a dissensus to a modus
vivendi of persons loosely allied by some principles that justify
duly enacted valid laws. The United States is still in this stage
of development since its constitutional consensus is more or less
of a modus vivendi.'22 To reach the second more advanced
stage of development, which is the desired overlapping consen-
sus, the range of conceptions supporting different social and
economic interests must be narrowed substantially; otherwise,
"deeply conflicting political and economic interests" 23 will con-
tinue to prevent an evolution towards an overlapping doctrinal
consensus.
Evolution towards a wider, deeper and firmer consensus
requires a major shift in the thinking of countless people.124 If
an overlapping doctrinal consensus is ever established, there
will be a concordant fit between everyone's reasonably flexible
comprehensive views and the LPC.125 Rawls has "a reasonable
faith" that such an overlapping consensus will be estab-
lished.126 Faith is needed when evidence is lacking.
Rawls does not dwell on the difficulties obstructing progress
towards an overlapping consensus. Many ongoing conflicts in
121. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 158.
122. See id. at 163.
123. Id. at 168.
124. If more people cooperate with one another and appreciate the value of contin-
ued cooperation, then they eventually might realize that the values of social unity
greatly outweigh the values of their principles which obstruct the establishment of an
overlapping consensus. Id. at 163-68.
125. RAWIS, supra note 2, at 171.
126. Id. at 172.
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the United States are not likely to be settled soon. For exam-
ple, citizens disagree whether and to what extent economic
rights "merit legal if not constitutional protection."121 Political
gridlock prevents the government from taking innovative and
significant legislative steps to ameliorate the suffering and
distrust of an alienated and embittered underclass. Angry dis-
putes exist concerning abortion, affirmative action, the rights of
gays and lesbians, and a host of other social justice issues. A
consensus in the United States does not support Rawls's weak
conception of religious freedom which does not go beyond liberty
of conscience and equal protection of the laws. 28
Rawls does not give much weight to the interests of religious
persons who believe, as Abraham Lincoln did, that "important
principles may and must be inflexible." 29 If an increasing
number of lawmakers adopt Rawls's secularism, the gaps be-
tween liberals and religious persons will widen, as extremism
in the defense of religion-centered family values will become a
more acceptable option for alienated religious conservatives
condemning what they see as the callous and imperialistic secu-
larism of many American liberals.8 0 Clearly, Rawls's LPC in
its present form is not likely to narrow the gaps between reli-
gious persons and relentless secularists. Therefore, Rawls's
desire for a stable overlapping consensus is wishful thinking for
the foreseeable future.
VI. THE EXCESSIVE SECULARISM OF RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM
Rawls can justify certain kinds of civil disobedience (e.g.,
refusal to engage in wartime combat) if a citizen's refusal to
obey the law sends a message that "addresses the sense of
127. Id. at 159.
128. Id. at 335. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488.
129. Abraham Lincoln, Last Public Address, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SELECTED
SPEECHES, MESSAGES, AND LETTERS 285, 290 (T. Harry Williams ed., 1964).
130. One writer, a pastor yet, wrote "This religious right confronts us with a threat
far greater than the old threat of Communism." Robert H. Meneilly, Government is
Not God's Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, § 4, at 15. For many other examples of
the anti-religious fervor that often characterizes the liberal point of view, see STEPHEN
L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HoW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
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justice of a majority of the community,""1 but his LPC does
not guarantee Quakers a religion based exemption from combat
duty. Consequently, a disturbing question is whether Rawls's
excessively secular LPC3 2 callously ignores the dilemma reli-
gious persons confront when their civil and religious duties
conflict.
Rawls recognizes that all citizens must be left sufficient space
to pursue their conceptions of good since the primary function
of principles of justice is to sustain "ways of life fully worthy of
citizens' devoted allegiance."33 Nevertheless, religious liberty
can be unduly burdened by Rawls's emphasis on the virtues of
reasonable pluralism. This kind of exclusionary pluralism deni-
grates some religious persons as unacceptable because their
conceptions of goodness and justice are not those most citizens
"as equals might reasonably be expected to 'endorse."34 As a
result, if those persons unwilling to accommodate religious
persons are numerous and powerful enough, they often threaten
the less well-represented, the forgotten, or ignored.3 5
Among the many religious persons who would be threatened
if Rawl's ideas prevail would be the Amish-American parents
who may be jailed if they do not send their offspring to accred-
ited schools that teach teenagers "to be fully cooperating mem-
bers of society."'36 In Rawls's ideal society, each Amish child,
without exception, must learn "the [liberal] political virtues so
that they [all] want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation
in their relations with the rest of society."'37 The sectarian
aims of Amish parents conflict with Rawls's secular political
liberalism, which has a "different aim."38
131. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 364.
132. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 194 n.28 (admission by Rawls that excessive secu-
larism is a concern of several persons commenting on his work).
133. Id. at 174.
134. Id. at 51.
135. Rawls's reliance on an overlapping consensus actually leaves too little space for
anyone with convictions who wants to engage actively in politics. See Williams, supra
note 2, at 17.
136. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 199.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
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The only remedy for the Amish is to petition the elected
representatives of the supermajority, euphemistically called the
overlapping consensus. In such cases, public reason determines
whether a regime's "institutions allow sufficient space for ways
of life worthy of citizens' devoted allegiance."'39 Although
Rawls insists that the LPC leaves enough space for the rational
pursuit of conceptions of the good permitted by the LPC, 40
the Amish and other religious sects actually have inadequate
space or freedom.' 4' Instead of worrying about excessive secu-
larism, ideological conformity, and democratic despotism, Rawls
coldly responds to the complaining Amish whose needs are
ignored by lawmakers by "say[ing]: if a political conception of
justice is mutually recognized by reasonable and rational citi-
zens who affirm the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in an
overlapping consensus, ... this fact itself confirms that its free
basic institutions allow sufficient space for ways of life worthy
of citizens' devoted allegiance."
This kind of confirmation, Rawls insists, is the "most reason-
able assurance political liberalism allows-and the most we can
reasonably have that our political institutions contain sufficient
space for worthy ways of life, and that in this sense our politi-
cal society is just and good."
The challenge for liberal theorists, as Rawls obviously recog-
nizes, is to formulate principles and priorities whereby adher-
ents of radically divergent conceptions of good can coexist
peacefully and amiably. Rawls's theory in its current version
falls short of this desideratum because it is excessively secular
and because its guarantee of basic liberties dilutes the
protection provided by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,144 which upheld religious exemption claims by Amish
parents. The excessive secularism of Rawls's LPC is exhibited
most clearly by his discussion of the ideal of public reason.
139. Id. at 210.
140. Id. at 208.
141. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
142. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 210.
143. Id.
144. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35.
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VII. THE EXCLUSIONARY AND RESTRICTIVE IDEALS OF
PUBLIC REASON
Public reason is a Rawlsian conception concerned with consti-
tutional essentials, the common good and fundamental jus-
tice.'45 In non-public discourse, people may freely express
their metaphysical, moral, and religious opinions; however,
citizens adhering to the LPC are less free when voting in na-
tional elections or discussing constitutional law and basic jus-
tice. For example, ideal citizens endorsing the LPC and adher-
ing to its ideal of public reason may not cite or rely upon reli-
gious precepts as such in public discourse.
In this section, I emphasize those aspects of Rawls's ideal of
public reason that pertain to my concern that his overall ap-
proach is excessively secular. A telling example of Rawls's secu-
larism is his view that Lincoln's two Proclamations of Thanks-
giving in 1863 and 1864, if repeated by a contemporary Ameri-
can President, would violate limits set by public reason. 146
These limits require government officials to delete allusions to a
deity in proclamations since any public address by an official
can be communicated adequately without religious references.
Of course, American presidents traditionally refer to God on
Thanksgiving day. This custom comforts, perhaps, millions of
citizens. Nevertheless, any publicly acknowledged reverence for
the sacred violates moral duties imposed by public reason.
147
Needless to say, Rawls's secular ideal is aspirational; it is not
descriptive of American politics and traditions. 48
145. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 213-14.
146. Id. at 254.
147. The ideal of public reason imposes moral, not legal, duties. Id. at 217.
148. See id. Rawls concedes that not all liberals accept his version of public reason.
Id. Indeed, many liberal theorists have even stricter views. See Rawls's discussion of
the so-called "exclusive view" of public reason. Id. at 247-52. In the Dewey Lecture at
the University of Chicago Law School that was delivered on November 4, 1993, Rawls
admitted that his view of public reason needs to be clarified and liberalized because
the version of public reason described in POLITIcAL LIBERALISM moves liberalism-and
here I paraphrase-"in a way that destroys itself and our political tradition." Appar-
ently, one's duty to abide by the canons of public reason obtains now only when a
citizen acts as a judge, as a public official or as a person who takes part in political
campaigns, especially as an orator or in party platform deliberations. In other situa-
tions, citizens may introduce non-public reasons if and only if the values expressed,
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Consistent with Rawls's aspirations, let us imagine the exis-
tence of a liberal republic called "Academe" where the citizens
do not support their public positions with "reasons given explic-
itly in terms of comprehensive doctrines;"'49 when they vote,
they are not motivated by distinctively religious conceptions of
right and good. Instead, the politically virtuous citizens of Aca-
deme rely only on political values conforming to the ideal of
public reason 50 and its guidelines. Academe's citizens adher-
ing to these guidelines do not deviate from the "presently
accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in com-
mon sense, and the [uncontroversiall methods and conclusions
of science. " "' Social policy and laws in Academe must "rest
on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citi-
zens generally. Otherwise, [Academe's] political conception
would not provide a public basis of justification." 52 Again,
God-fearing persons deviating shamelessly from these guidelines
are considered unreasonable. Indeed, any supernatural religious
belief is outside the framework of political "values that others
can reasonably be expected to endorse and .. in good
faith ... defend."'
Rawls does not say much about the enforcement mechanisms
of his ideal of public reason; how much does it rely on peer
pressure and how much does it rely on social pressures trace-
able to government officials? How much does it rely on judges
whose views on freedom of speech are shaped by the conven-
tions holding together the overlapping consensus? Answers to
which support the political measures that they propose, are compatible with public
reason and the LPC. Rawls also now concedes that public reason is pluralistic and
changing. Personal Communication from Greg Sergienko, December 1, 1993.
It is not yet known to what extent Rawls plans to revise his conception of public
reason, but Rawls's revision of his thesis, when published in final form will probably
moot some of my major objections to the version published in POLrIcAL LIBERALISM.
This revision by Rawls supports my thesis that academic philosophers cannot create
"fair" rules of substantive justice in the privacy of their study but must engage in an
ongoing dialogue with the persons affected by the proposed fair restrictions on their
individual rights and liberties.
149. RAWLS, supra note 2 at 247.
150. Id. at 241.
151. Id. at 224.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id. at 226.
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these questions are unclear. However, an ominous hint of du-
ress is suggested when we read that a question to be settled by
public reason is: "what religions are to be tolerated?" " Such
a question demonstrates the extent to which the Rawlsian ideal
represents "the politically marginal standpoint of American
academic liberalism"' 5 so often insensitive to the value of in-
put from persons motivated primarily by their religious perspec-
tives. The potentially mischievous question "what religions are
to be tolerated" encourages ideological cleansing and invidious
discrimination adversely affecting the "intolerable" religions.
Clearly, the republic of Academe does not welcome adherents
of "militant Hinduism or Islam, for instance, or the most fanati-
cal variants of Orthodox Judaism."'56 Even non-militant reli-
gions are unwelcome; in Academe, any religion that does not
give its adherents sufficient leeway to conform to the ideal of
public reason is beyond the pale of religious toleration. In Aca-
deme, religious persons cannot adequately interact politically
with others in a robust and thought-provoking mode of commu-
nication because public reason guidelines prohibit nearly all
references in public to religious texts and religious prophets.
In a well-ordered society like Academe's, there are very few
situations where religious persons are allowed to refer explicitly
to their religious beliefs when they cast their votes and engage
in political advocacy. In one situation opponents of direct gov-
ernment aid to church-related schools may explain to co-reli-
gionists favoring nondiscriminatory financial aid to all schools
why their shared religious beliefs prohibit government aid to
church-affiliated schools.'57  "MThis knowledge," Rawls says,
"surely strengthens mutual trust and public confidence" among
the citizenry.' Obviously, Rawls's ideal of public reason con-
tains a content-based double standard: religious speech
strengthening secularism and the liberal coalition in a well-
ordered society is permissible; otherwise it is not.
154. Id. at 214.
155. Gray, supra note 3, at 35.
156. Williams, supra note 2, at 17.
157. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 249.
158. Id. at 249.
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Rawls also allows persons to rely explicitly on religious rea-
sons to support their political arguments when the constitution-
al consensus is disintegrating, but only if they intend to streng-
then the endangered liberal political conception. 9 According-
ly, Rawls condones much of the anti-slavery rhetoric occurring
in the decades prior to the American Civil War but only be-
cause many abolitionists sincerely believed that, in their day,
religious rhetoric was "the best way to bring about a well-or-
dered and just society."60 Again, Rawls employs a double
standard: his ideal of public reason never allows citizens en-
gaged in political activity to refer to religious beliefs that un-
dermine the LPC.
Rawls does not argue that citizens must "'pluck out their
religious convictions'" and think about matters of basic justice
and constitutional essentials as if "'they started from
scratch.'" 6 ' He claims instead that the political judgments of
religious persons will be basically the same even if they disre-
gard their superfluous beliefs in the supernatural. Rawls states
that persons need not speak the whole truth when a partial
truth conforms to the ideal of public reason and disguises the
roots of their political judgment. Rawls's thesis makes sense
only if all the persons voting or engaged in political advocacy
are already liberal, reasonable, and domesticated citizens of
Academe who choose to be constrained by the limits of public
reason.
162
Even Immanuel Kant conceded that religious persons who
fail to be sincere are in their own opinions "object[s] of the
deepest contempt."163 Rawls, however, in this situation is un-
sympathetic and unforgiving, even though compliance with his
ideal of public reason is an extremely difficult task for persons
159. Id. at 251.
160. Id. at 250.
161. Id. at 244 n.33 (quoting KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND PO-
LITICAL CHOICE 155 (1988)).
162. See Williams, supra note 2, at 17.
163. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITs OF REASON ALONE 178 (Harper
Torchbook ed., Harper & Brothers 1960) (Theodore M. Greene & John R. Silber
trans.,1934).
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whose religious precepts are internalized. When internalized
religious values dominate a person's mental decisionmaking,
they are virtually an integral and inseparable facet of that
person's identity." If such persons were asked to separate
their non-political values from their political values, each would
say: "What you want me to do just isn't me." 6 '
Rawls claims that religious persons can honor both their
religion and public reason "when three conditions are satis-
fied:" 1
66
(a) [when they] give very great and normally overriding
weight to the ideal [public reason] prescribes; (b) [when
they] believe public reason is suitably complete, that is, for
at least the great majority of fundamental questions, possi-
bly for all, some combination and balance of political values
alone reasonably show the answer; and finally (c) [when
they] believe that the particular view [they] propose, and
the law or policy based thereon, expresses a reasonable
combination and balance of those values.167
Under these conditions, according to Rawls, the fact that a
person does not refer to the religious beliefs that support her
political judgments does not mean that she is insincere. 161
The foregoing three conditions of authentic behavior often
cannot be satisfied when religious persons have firmly rooted
convictions in conflict with public reason. For example, the LPC
and public reason, according to Rawls, provide women with a
right to choose an abortion in the first trimester. 69 If a reli-
gious person's belief in the sanctity of human life extends to
the first trimester, that religious person might not be able to
lay aside her firmly rooted convictions and still feel she is
164. Habermas writes: "[Ideas of the good life are not notions that simply occur to
individuals as abstract imperatives; they shape the identity of groups and individuals
in such a way that they form an integral part of culture and personality." HABERMAS,
supra note 90, at 177.
165. Habermas writes: "A person who questions the forms of life in which his identi-
ty has been shaped questions his very existence." Id. at 177-78.
166. RAWIS, supra note 2, at 241.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 242.
169. Id. at 243 n.32.
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acting authentically when she condones, either by silence, word,
deed or vote, laws permitting abortion. Indeed, many religious
persons are not similarly situated with the adaptive persons
Rawls "recognize[s] as liberal;" 7 ° however, public reason does
not make exceptions for persons who cannot adapt.
In Rawls's view, if a person's religious doctrines cannot sup-
port a woman's right to choose abortion then her "comprehen-
sive doctrines . . . run afoul of public reason."'7' Moreover, re-
ligiously devout voters who adhere to their unreasonable com-
prehensive doctrines are perceived as "unjust, politically speak-
ing" since they are willing to use political power coercively for
the wrong reasons.'72 Under these circumstances, believers in
unreasonable religious doctrines can be contained "in self-de-
fense."'73 How they can be contained is not explained. Will
they be monitored by government agencies, or excluded from
political party platform cdmmittees? Will their religious organi-
zations be denied tax exemptions if their members speak out in
public and use religious metaphors and rhetoric?
Whatever the form of public reason's enforcement mechanism,
Rawls's support of public reason is naive partly because sup-
pression of religious rhetoric forces politically active religious
leaders to conceal their goals. For example, certain religious
organizations advancing fundamentalist objectives could pretend
to adhere to "reasonable" doctrines when they sponsor so-called
"stealth candidates." 74 Allegedly some right wing religious or-
ganizations already conceal their true agendas until after their
stealth candidates are elected.' v Other groups allegedly en-
gage in terrorism to punish the United States for its aggression
against their religious traditions.'76 Surely, a candid public
airing of a religious person's dogmatic worldview is preferable
170. Id. at 290.
171. Id. at 243.
172. Id. at 247.
173. Id.
174. See Eric T. Schneiderman, Let's Keep Political Coercion out of Religion; Reed's
Stealth Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, § 4, at 14 (referring to the Christian
Coalition, a right wing religious organization).
175. See Meneilly supra note 130, at 15.
176. See Richard Bernstein, American Law Tackles Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1993, § 4, at 1.
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to stealth or terrorism. In Brandeis's hopeful immortal words,
"repression breeds hate," "discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine," and
the "freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth."177 The extent to which Rawls believes in freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion is discussed in the next
section.
VIII. THE BASIC LIBERTIES
A. The Abbreviated List of Basic Liberties
Basic liberties are indispensable elements of Rawls's concep-
tion of "fair terms of social cooperation"17 since they enable
individuals to develop and exercise their two powers of moral
personality.' 9  The distinction between ordinary and basic
liberties is fundamentally important in constitutional law. Un-
like ordinary liberties, 80 basic liberties may not be constitu-
tionally restricted by lawmakers trying to advance religion,
perfectionist values, utilitarian conceptions of good or other
comprehensive doctrines.' 8 ' A basic liberty may be limited on-
177. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
178. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 304.
179. Recall that the first power of moral personality pertains to each person's sense
of justice, the capacity to be reasonable, enabling everyone to be moved by a just and
stable scheme of social cooperation conforming to "justice as fairness" principles. The
second moral power pertains to each person's determinate conceptions of good and
each's capacity to evaluate, after due deliberation, his or her conception of "what is
valuable in human life," the capacity to be rational. Id. at 19. The regulative nature
of the second power "enable[s] us to think of ourselves as affirming our way of life in
accordance with the full, deliberate, and reasoned exercise of our intellectual powers."
Id. at 313.
180. Ordinary liberties are not protected as much as basic liberties but they may
not be denied or limited without sufficient cause. See id. at 292.
181. Id. at 295. The "basic liberties constitute a family, and ... it is this family
that has [lexical] priority and not any single liberty by itself." Id. at 357.
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ly in so-called self-limiting situations 82 or when two or more
basic liberties conflict.
183
The basic liberties protected by Rawls are few in number.'
i 4
They include some liberties significant for the development and
informed exercise of everyone's sense of justice such as freedom
of thought 8 and the political liberties (e.g., right to vote or
run for office) that guarantee everyone roughly equal access to
public facilities and the political process. 18  "These basic liber-
ties require some form of representative democratic regime and
the requisite protections for the freedom of political speech and
press, freedom of assembly, and the like."' These basic liber-
ties of conscience... and association189 are connected to
everyone's capacity rationally to advance their permissible con-
ceptions of good. The remaining supportive basic liberties recog-
nized by Rawls include "the liberty and integrity of the person
violated, for example, by slavery and serfdom... and the
182. Id. at 341. A liberty is self-limiting when regulations are necessary for its con-
tinued adequate exercise; for example, limits on political campaign contributions may
be necessary to insure everyone the fair value of their political liberties. See id. at
356-57. Moreover, content-neutral rules of parliamentary procedure during a debate,
may be necessary for effective freedom of speech.
183. Id. at 295. The ambit of the basic liberties must be adjusted so that each one
is tailored to fit appropriately into a scheme of constitutional law secured equally for
all citizens. Id. Each basic liberty has a "central range of application." Id. at 178.
184. Rawls concedes that lawmakers in the future may modify the original list of
basic liberties, so long as the list is improved. Id. at 293. To determine whether a
modification is an improvement, the lawmakers should ask whether the change will
guarantee "essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise"
of every citizen's "two powers of moral personality over a complete life." Id.
185. Id. at 332. Rawls's conception of freedom of thought does not include any affir-
mative duty on the part of the government not to burden the free exercise of reli-
gion.
186. Id. at 327-30. "Formal equality is not enough" to guarantee all persons, rich
and poor, an equally effective voice in public affairs. Id. at 361.
187. Id. at 335.
188. Liberty of conscience "includes the freedom and integrity of the internal life of
religious associations and the liberty of persons to determine their religious affilia-
tions in social conditions that are free." Id. at 341. This liberty is not co-extensive
with a right created by a limit on the government's power to interfere with the free
exercise of religion.
189. The basic liberty of association supports liberty of conscience by enabling per-
sons "to associate with other like-minded citizens." Id. at 313.
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rights and liberties covered by the rule of law."1 90 This list is
too short.
The abbreviated list of basic liberties guaranteed by the LPC
"specifies the common and guaranteed status of equal citizens
in a well-ordered democratic society."' 9' The free exercise of
religion is not included as a basic liberty on Rawls's list bec-
ause it provides religious persons with special privileges which
violates Rawls's notion of fair terms of social cooperation be-
cause conscientious refusals to obey laws may not be justified
by "an unworldly view bound to remain a sectarian doc-
trine."'92 In short, according to Rawls, granting exemptions to
"unreasonable" persons adhering to religious belief systems is
unfair to persons adhering to non-religious belief systems.
The LPC does not protect the religiously grounded conduct of
the Old Order Amish whose religion pervades and determines
the entire mode of life of its adherents.' 93 The values and pro-
grams of modern schools "are in sharp conflict with the funda-
mental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion... sub-
stantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child, and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community."' 94 Of course, special exemptions for
the Amish treat religious persons differently from other citi-
zens, and such differential treatment violates the Rawlsian
ideal of a common and guaranteed status of equal citizens:
Justice Souter is more accommodating than Rawls, and more
attuned to the history of religious freedom in the United States.
He writes: "A law that is religion neutral on its face or in its
190. Id. at 335. The rule of law guarantees the regular and impartial administration
of public rules. This is a guarantee of formal justice: the idea that like cases should
be treated alike. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 235-43. "The right to
hold and have the exclusive use of personal property" is apparently another basic
liberty. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 298. "The role of this liberty is to allow a sufficient
material basis for a sense of personal independence and self respect, both of which
are essential for the development and exercise of the moral powers." Id. Rawls also
wants lawmakers to protect freedom of movement and occupation because this pro-
tection is necessary if the basic liberties are to be properly guaranteed. Id. at 335.
191. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 335.
192. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 382.
193. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972).
194. Id. at 216.
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purpose may lack neutrality in its effect by forbidding some-
thing that religion requires or requiring something that religion
forbids."'95 Souter recognizes that religious persons may be
dissimilarly treated because they are dissimilarly situated with
reference to the effects of a law. Rawls does not use this test of
equality, which goes beyond formal equality, because he does
not recognize "the value of religious freedom as an affirmative
individual liberty."'96
Religious liberties, of course, cannot be protected absolutely;
the most protective test developed by the United States
Supreme Court involves strict scrutiny, a balancing test. 197
This is another reason why the free exercise guarantee is omit-
ted from Rawls's lists of basic liberties: he generally opposes
the balancing of competing interests. 98  Although Rawls
claims he opposes delicate balancing tests when it comes to le-
gal questions about the identity and scope of basic liberties,
ironically he himself attempts to strike "[a] reasonable balance"
among competing political values, and he would protect a
woman's duly qualified right of abortion. 9 9 This inconsistency
is not adequately explained by Rawls. In other respects, Rawls's
theory of constitutional law is incoherent, incomplete and con-
fusing. For example, Rawls recognizes that the right to vote is
a basic political liberty; yet, his ideal of public reason condemns
as unreasonable religious persons whose vote against a law is
based consciously on theological grounds. In the next section,
we see that Rawls protects political speech absolutely in con-
trast to religious speech, which is condemned as morally obnox-
195. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2241
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring). As an example, Justice Souter writes, "A secular law,
applicable to all, that prohibits consumption of alcohol . . .will affect members of
religions that require the use of wine differently from members of other religions and
nonbelievers, disproportionately burdening the practice of, say, Catholicism or Juda-
ism." Id.
196. Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
197. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 237 (White, J., concurring).
198. See generally RAWLS, supra note 2, at 353. Rawls explains that the basic liber-
ties "do not depend on conjectural calculations concerning the greatest net balance of
social interests (or of social values). In justice as fairness such calculations have no
place." Id. at 317.
199. Id. at 243-44 n.32.
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ious if a religious person's political advocacy refers explicitly to
religious precepts.00
B. The Basic Liberty of Political Speech
When lawmakers specify or adjust-the range of basic liber-
ties, Rawls wants them to use the criterion of significance in-
stead of ad hoc balancing tests.2 0 ' He believes that "a liberty
is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or
less essentially involved in, or is a more or less necessary in-
stitutional means to protect, the full, informed and effective
exercise of the moral powers."202 For example, freedom of
thought is essentially involved with the development of a
person's sense of justice and capacity to be moved by political
principles relevant to a shared sense of justice.2 3 Accordingly,
freedom of thought also protects speech, "an essential part of
which is the necessity of revolution, or the use of unlawful force
and the incitement thereto as a means of political change."204
According to Rawls, subversive advocacy significantly enhanc-
es the development of everyone's sense of justice since revolu-
tionaries go beyond simply shouting "'Revolt! Revolt!' They give
reasons."20 5 Rawls maintains that:
[tlo repress subversive advocacy is to suppress the discus-
sion of these reasons, and to do this is to restrict the free
and informed public use of our reason in judging the justice
of the [political order] ... and its social policies. And thus
the basic liberty of freedom of thought is violated.06
In other words, the political dissident must be given free rein
since his calls for revolution enable others to consider whether
200. See supra text part VII.
201. See generally RAWLS, supra note 2, at 317, 353.
202. Id. at 335.
203. Id. at 334-35.
204. Id. at 343.
205. Id. at 346 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION (Jamie Kalven ed.,
(1987)).
206. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 346.
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the political order is conforming, as it should, to "justice as
fairness" principles and the LPC.
In extraordinary emergency situations where the procedures
of democratic institutions can no longer operate,0 7 the sup-
pression of subversive advocacy could be justified, but only to
prevent a greater or more significant loss to a basic liberty.08
Absent this type of emergency, however, there is never any jus-
tification for punishing speakers who intend to convince others
that revolution is necessary. Therefore, the United States
Supreme Court's focus on the imminent and likely dangers of
inciting speech "is beside the point."20 9 Summarizing Rawls's
position, all subversive political speech, no matter how danger-
ous, is absolutely protected so long as the nation's free political
institutions still operate and adequately protect freedom of
thought, a free press and other basic liberties.21 °
Religious persons, among others, may wonder why subver-
sives who call for violent revolts are fully protected, while non-
violent Quakers are not constitutionally guaranteed exemptions
from the duty to kill others in wartime combat. Rawls points
out the crucial difference: Quakers rely explicitly on religion to
justify their refusal to kill; revolutionaries urging "death to
capitalists" rely on political ideas relevant to the development
and informed exercise of everyone's sense of justice.21' In
short, religious persons are never constitutionally entitled to
exemptions from general laws whereas revolutionary speech
inciting violence for political purposes is always fully protected
while institutions of government still operate.1
Rawls employs a criterion of significance to determine the
range of basic liberties 21s connected with the two powers of
moral personality,2 4 but Rawls's explanation leaves many
questions unanswered. For example, do the two powers of moral
207. Id. at 354.
208. Id. at 356.
209. Id. at 355.
210. Id.
211. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 379, 382, 385.
212. Id. at 382.
213. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 525.
214. Id. See also supra note 179.
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personality include a moral sense... that includes the capacity
to compromise with persons who reject the LPC because it is
excessively secular. Are liberals always content with the status
quo so long as it is supported by a stable overlapping doctrinal
consensus adhered to by reasonable and rational persons? How
much room does Rawls's LPC leave for a critical theory of liber-
alism?21 6 Is there any way to amend the Constitution to guar-
antee freedom of religion, or does a special exemption for reli-
gious persons always violate the provision guaranteeing each
person "an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal
basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all?"217 What happens when the political dissident
inciting revolution uses religious terms; does this embellishment
subject her to punitive sanctions?
Rawls's book Political Liberalism, relies on a narrow view of
public reason to answer these questions. Rawls, however, con-
sistently overestimates the ascertainability and reliability, of
public reason which, in practice, is really public opinion, an
impure meld of reason, passion and prudence which is precisely
the difficulty Rawls is trying to ameliorate.21" To the extent
that Rawls is trying singlehandedly dictate the permissible
content of evolving public reason, his effort is unrealistic and
unsuccessful idealism. In short, the LPC is currently an inade-
quate and incomplete source for a coherent and workable
scheme of constitutional law,219 and Rawls's excessive secular-
ism creates tensions that defeat his attempt to achieve social
unity.
215. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).
216. Even communitarianism is rejected by Raws. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 282.
217.,RAWLS, supra note 2, at 291. Although anyone may legally engage in political
speech and advocate revolution, because political speech and freedom of thought are
basic liberties, the Rawlsian ideal of public reason represses expression of reasons
derived from comprehensive doctrines, especially those that are incompatible with
liberalism and the prospects for an overlapping consensus.
218. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 186 (1989).
219. As Rawls recognizes, the task of a well-ordered society is to design a
practicable scheme for making the basic liberties compatible with each other in some
workable and coherent constitutional arrangement. RATIS, supra note 2, at 297-98.
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IX. CONCLUSION
This article is an analysis of John Rawls's abstruse answer to
the following question: in a republic of self-governing people
divided by different conceptions of goodness and justice, which
conception is best for regulating conduct and protecting liber-
ties? Not suprisingly, Rawls selects his own LPC, because,
when compared to competing conceptions, it is allegedly more
likely to produce stable social unity. In Rawls's view, the LPC
is more likely to produce social unity because it is the least
deficient proposal for motivating persons to cooperate with each
other on a basis of mutual respect.
Rawls's highly theoretical book does not adequately explain
how societies actually alter their paradigms of justice, and he
does not adequately deal with real problems of power politics or
the subtle and shifting relationships between morality, law and
politics. His approach creates the mystifying illusion that a
system of justice can be built up from a few abstractions about
society, persons, and their so-called moral powers. In reality,
competing conceptions of the common good and justice, and
their connections, if any, cannot be authoritatively prejudged as
fair or unfair by a political philosopher expounding theory.22 °
The task of judging the validity of proposed principles of law
and justice belongs to the participants in the political process.
Before their task is completed, none of the competing proposed
principles have self-evident validity.
Given the dynamics of pluralism,22' the "justice as fairness"
principles selected by the parties in the original hypothetical
position would probably not survive totally intact if they were
debated in the United States. Some basic liberties might be
deleted by realistic politicans and citizens (probably the guaran-
teed minimum level of welfare proposed by Rawls) and others
added (probably the free exercise of religion).222 Historically,
220. See HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 248.
221. Pluralism as used here posits both diversity and potential unity. Pluralism
enfeebles the notion of a common good, but this is the price of having a non-tyranni-
cal regime and minority rights.
222. The Supreme Court diluted the free exercise clause in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); But see Religious Freedom Restoration Act, infra note
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Americans have vacillated between models of liberalism that
privilege the common good and those competing models that
posit separate individuals equally pursuing their self-interest.
During this ongoing debate, a political philosopher like Rawls is
a helpful participant; his influence during the process of will
formation, however, depends on the soundness of his
arguments-a judgment ultimately made by all the participants
rather than made by an academic philosopher. Not even Rawls
predicts the imminent arrival of an overlapping doctrinal con-
sensus in the United States.
Rawls's thought experiment, imaginatively creating parties in
the original position,223 reminds us that "you may get a fair
division of a cake by asking someone to cut it who does not
know which [slice] he will get."224 However, the cake cutter
ought to know whether the other people at the table like cake
and are hungry, or have diabetes. Rawls essentially specifies,
without consulting those adversely affected, the size of
everyone's slice of religious freedom. Rawls should admit that
philosophers cannot put themselves in the place of participants
in the political process. Obviously, "the theoretician's mind [is]
no substitute for real discourse."225
Rawls's controversial move from a procedural model of jus-
tice, called the original position, to substantive "justice as fair-
ness" principles has been criticized often, even by admirers of
his attempt to make liberalism more coherent. 226 Although in
Rawls's thought experiment 227 the veil of ignorance artificially
eliminates the bias of self-interest and simulates fair bargaining
conditions, one philosopher's monologue obviously is not a sub-
stitute for an ongoing political debate.
237.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 32-38.
224. See Williams, supra note 2, at 17.
225. THoMAs MCCARTHY, INTRODUCTION TO MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICA-
TIVE ACTION ix (1990).
226. See AUTONOMY & SOLIDARITY: INTERVIEWS WITH JORGEN HABERMAS 199-201
(Peter Dews ed., 1992) [hereinafter INTERVIEWS]; see also HABERMAS, supra note 90,
at 175-76.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 32-38.
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According to an alternative model of discourse ethics, citizens
participating in ongoing political dialogues demonstrate their
moral maturity by putting themselves in the positions of their
political opponents.228 This attitude of empathy does not pre-
vent participants in public advocacy from considering the politi-
cally relevant ideas of religious persons uncomfortable with the
extent of social permissiveness in modernity. Indeed, in order to
evaluate carefully and sensitively whether a religious person's
conception of justice is sound and workable, liberal secularists
must suspend their prejudices and empathize, at least tempo-
rarily, with religious participants engaged in an effort to reach
a genuine mutual understanding or a basis for a modus viven-
di.229 Unfortunately, Rawls presumes to decide, qua philoso-
pher king, that social unity is more compelling than a person's
religion even though the social unity he has in mind alienates
many religious persons from their traditions and gods. °
The more empathetic procedures of political will formation,
suggested by Jiirgen Habermas, are not more attainable in
practice than Rawls's ideal conception of justice. The Haberma-
sian model of discourse ethics, however, does not provide us
with a ready made set of substantive principles and a scheme
of ordered priorities. In other words, the outcome of a truly
open-ended debate over principles of justice according to dis-
course ethics is not pre-ordained or prejudged. The outcome
depends on flesh and blood persons with freedom of choice who
must justify their proposals, claims and constructs. Because the
outcome of the debate in the discourse ethics model is not nec-
essarily the same as a political theorist's preferences, it is less
228. In this respect, the construction of the original position by Rawls has similar
aims. INTERVIEWS, supra note 226, at 259. However, when Rawls moves from the
construction of the original position to a statement of the carefully worded "justice as
fairness" principles, he becomes an advocate rather than a philosopher describing the
conditions for a fair decisionmaking process.
229. As Habermas writes, there should be 'a shared, reciprocal taking over of per-
spectives" so that all persons affected can test whether a proposed principle "is ac-
ceptable from the perspective of everyone else's understanding of the world and of
themselves." INTERVIEWS, supra note 219, at 251.
230. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972). "In the Amish belief higher
learning tends to develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from
God." Id. at 210.
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substantive, less presumptuous, and more adaptable to context
than Rawls's excessively secular ideal of public reason.
In all societies in every era "where ideals are at issue, the
particular passions and memories of the particular individuals
involved will largely determine their beliefs."23' Underestimat-
ing this feature of human nature, Rawls, like many philoso-
phers preceding him, overestimates the relationship between
reason and "a decent social order."232 In the United States,
non-conformists are not expected to surrender their beliefs
when they vote. Moreover, in the United States, extremists
advocating the enactment of religion-based laws are not purged
or systematically contained despite the dangers they pose. They
often proliferate, flourish and eventually cancel each other out,
as James Madison hoped. Indeed, America has a remarkable
"big tent" capacity to cope with doctrines deemed unreasonable
by Rawls. Justice Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court in
Cantwell v. Connecticut=3 understood the significance of plu-
ralism and religious speech better than Rawls. Roberts wrote:
In the realm of religious faith, and that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to his exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even
to false statement. But the people of this nation have or-
dained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probabili-
ty of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on
the part of citizens of a democracy."
231. Hampshire, supra note 4, at 46.
232. Id.
233. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
234. Id. at 309.
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Similarly, in Thomas v. Collins,23 Justice Jackson wrote:
[I]t cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the
state to protect the public against false doctrine. The very
purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public au-
thority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind
through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this
field every person must be his own watchman for truth,
because the forefathers did not trust any government to
separate the true from the false for us. Nor would L"
Clearly, for religious persons, the American political system
is preferable to a Rawlsian regime where relentless secularists
"have created a political and legal culture that presses the
religiously faithful to be other than themselves ... as though
their faith does not matter to them.1
2 37
235. 326 U.S. 526 (1945).
236. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
237. CARTER, supra note 130, at 3. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Accommo-
dation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
685 (1992). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488, reinstates strict judicial scrutiny as the proper test for laws of general
applicability which substantially burden free exercise. In effect, the Act creates a
statutory right which returns free exercise jurisprudence to standards developed in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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